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Abstract 
This study examined the effect of capital structure on agency cost. Population of this research is conglomerate 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange, amounting to 29 companies. The study period is 2007-2012. 
Agency cost is measured using the ratio of operating expenses to sales and capital structure measured by the 
ratio of liabilities and equity. Analysis of the data used in this study is multiple regression. Institutional 
ownership, size and return on assets (ROA) is a variable control. The results showed that, capital structure, 
institutional ownership, size and ROA simultaneously positive and significant impact on the agency cost. Partial 
capital structure and significant positive effect on agency cost. Instititional ownership but not significant positive 
effect on agency cost. Size positive but not significant effect on agency cost. ROA and significant negative effect 
on agency cost. 
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Introduction 
So that the company can be more effective and efficient in operation, the company should perform the separation 
of functions between the owners and managers (Berle and Means, 1932). Separation of functions between the 
owner and the manager will give rise to agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) the emergence of agency problems within the company because of a conflict of interest 
between shareholders and management. Natural conflict of interest between shareholders from outside the 
company managers arising from the possibility manager took the decision to increase the personal wealth at the 
expense of the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
misalignment between the objectives of shareholders from outside the company with the manager will cause the 
cost of agency (agency cost) for the owner. 
Results of research conducted by many researchers there are inconsistencies, such as Jensen (1986), Agrawal and 
knoeber (1996), Florackis and Ozkan (2004), Zhang and LI (2008), Knight and Weir (2009), Xiao (2009) , Gul et 
al (2012), Zheng (2013), Lakshmi (2013), Mohammed (2013), shows that the capital Structure can reduce 
agency cost, while the results of research conducted by Li and Cui (2003), Pratheepkanth (2011), Siddiqui et al 
(2013) and Chechet and Olayiwola (2014), capital structure can not dampen the agency cost. So with the 
inconsistency of the results of the study, researchers wanted to examine the effect on the capital structure of the 
agency cost for the case in Indonesia. 
Research Question 
Based on the background research, the formulation of the problem of this research is: What effect on the capital 
structure on agency cost conglomerate companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
Research Objective 
The purpose of this study was to see whether the effect on the capital structure on agency cost conglomerate 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
Relationship Between Capital Structure and Agency Cost 
Jensen (1986) provides a solution to reduce agency cost is by way of the use of debt in the capital structure of the 
company. With the use of debt in the capital structure of the company, the company's managers have to make 
savings on expenses that are not important on free cast flows. The savings on free cast flows should be done by 
the manager because the manager had to pay principal and interest on the debt. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) conducted research on firm performance and mechanisms to control agency 
problems between managers and shareholders in the company in the US by using regression. Control 
mechanisms are tested in these studies is shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders, outside 
directors, debt policy, size (log assets), labor market and market manager or corporate control. Results of 
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research and Knoeber Agrawal (1996) found a relationship between firm performance with insider shareholdings, 
outside directors, and corporate debt control is active. Overall found for every optimal control as a surveillance 
mechanism except outside directors. 
Li and Cui (2003) conducted a study on the capital structure on agency cost study on Chinese Listed Firms to 
211 non-financial companies 1999-2001. The dependent variable is the agency cost is measured using return on 
equity (ROE). The independent variable is capital structure (debt to assets), ownership concentration. Variable 
control is the board size, firm size (log-sales) and industry (dummy). The results showed that the leverage 
associated positive and significant impact on agency cost. Ownership concentration (the Reviews largest 
shareholder) are positively related to agency cost but not significantly. Ownership concentration the five 
Reviews largest shareholders positively and significantly related to the agency cost. Board size associated 
negative and significant impact on agency cost. Firm size is positively related but not significant to the agency 
cost. 
Research conducted by Florackis and Ozkan (2004) on the companies in the UK regarding the Agency cost and 
corporate governance mechanisms with the data from 1999 to 2003 using regression. Florackis and Ozkan (2004) 
measured the agency cost using the ratio of the total sales by total assets (asset turnover) and the ratio of selling, 
general and administrative expenses (SG & A) to total sales as the dependent variable. And for the independent 
variable using the firm's ownership, board, compensation and capital structure. While controlnya variable is size 
(log assets), growth opportunity (market to book value). The results showed that the univariate analysis indicated 
Overall mekanaisme corporate governance such as managerial ownership, ownership concentration, salary, bank 
debt and short-term debt can help overcome the agency problem between managers and shareholders. And the 
relationship between governance and agency cost variable is very strong for the asset turnover ratio and SG & A 
expense ratio. 
Zhang and LI (2008) conducted a study on the UK Public Companies regarding the impact of capital structure on 
agency cost to the data in 2004 and 2005 by using multiple regression. Zhang and Li (2008) measured the 
agency cost using the ratio of operating expenses to sales. Research conducted by Zhang and Li (2008) produce 
that leverage (debt to assets) and significant negative effect on agency cost, and so does the size (log sales) and a 
significant negative effect on agency cost while return on assets a negative effect but not significantly. 
Knight and Weir (2009) conducted research on public companies in the UK with the regression of the agency 
cost and corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure. Knight and Weir (2009) found results that 
the agency cost associated with the governance mechanisms and ownership as well as the boards can reduce 
agency cost and debt was found to lower the agency cost. In this study, Knight and Weir (2009) measured the 
agency cost using 1) the ratio of sales to total assets; 2) free cash flows and growth prospects and a number of 
acquisitions. While the indicator for debt measured by the percentage of total debt to total assets. Board 
ownership is measured by the percentage of ownership by the board of total shares outstanding. Institutional 
ownership is measured by stock ownership by the board with a percentage of the total shares owned by 
institutional more than 3%. 
Xiao (2009) conducted a study on Chinese publicly listed companies with the ultimate ownership of the agency 
cost of individual and firm value for the period 2002 to 2007 the data using regression. Agency cost measured by 
the divergence between the ultimate owner's control rights and a low cash rights. Results of research conducted 
by Xiao (2009) illustrates that the agency cost and significant negative effect on firm value. Return on assets 
negatively related to the agency cost but not significantly. 
Pratheepkanth (2011) conducted research on capital structure, as measured by debt to equity and financial 
performance as measured by gross profi, net profit, ROI, ROE and ROA in the industry the company listed in the 
Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka to data for 2005-2009. Results showed that the capital structure is 
negatively related to financial performance. 
Gul et al (2012) conducted a study on the Karachi Stock Exchange for the period covering 2003 to 2006 on the 
agency cost, corporate governance and ownership structure by using a fixed effect regression as multivariate data 
analysis. To measure the agency cost, Gul et al (2012) using the asset utilization ratio. Research stiffened Gul et 
al (2012) suggest that the directors ownership and high institutional ownership can reduce agency cost. And a 
small number of councils also can reduce agency cost and independent directors have a positive relationship with 
the agency cost. 
Zheng (2013) conducted a study on listed companies in Chinese with 775 perusahaani and Shenzhen stock 
markets for the three years 2010-2012. The study looked at the relationship between the agency cost and capital 
structure by using OLS. Capital structure is measured by debt to assets ratio and long-time liabilities rate, and 
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agency cost rate is measured by the overhead expenses and asset turnover rate. Results showed that the agency 
cost has a negative relationship with the debt to assets ratio and the long time-related liabilities rate is positive 
but not significant with the agency cost. 
Lakshmi (2013) conducted a study on the capital structure on agency cost in Indian public companies to the data 
of 2002 to 2012 by using regression. The study found that the leverage (debt to assets) high can reduce agency 
costs and firm size (log of sales) and a significant negative associated with the agency cost agency cost while 
negative relates to firm performance but not significantly. 
Mohammed (2013) conducted research on agency cost and capital structure to the company listing on the 
Nigerian stock exchange as many as 94 companies for the period 2000-2006 using dynamic panel models. 
Agency cost as an independent variable that is measured by using a ratio of total sales and total assets. Capital 
structure as the dependent variable is measured by leverage (ratio of total liabilities and total assets). And as the 
control variable is the business risk (standard deviation of EBIT), profitabily (EBIT percentage of total assets), 
assets tangibility (percentage of total fixed assets total assets ratios), company size (log of sale) and growth 
prospects (total annual assets percentage change). The results showed that the capital structure on average 
negative associated with agency cost. 
Siddiqui et al (2013) conducted a study on the internal corporate governance mechanisms and agency cost for the 
period 2003-2010 at companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. They use the agency cost for the 
dependent variable with two proxies, namely asset utilization ratio and liquidity assets ratio. While the 
independent variable is the CEO tenure, board meetings, audit committee meetings, board size, duality, debt 
financing, ownership block. The results showed that the variable active board and audit committee and related 
assets utilization ratio of positive and strong. Blockholders ownership, board size, duality and asset utilization 
ratio has a negative relationship. When they use the liquidity assets ratio as a proxy for agency cost can be 
reduced with the frequency of meetings boards. Variable size boards and CEO tenure has a positive correlation 
with asset liquidity ratio. Variable duality, debt financing and investors who are not siqnifikan related to assets 
ratio liquidity. 
Chechet and Olayiwola (2014) conducted a study on company listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) for 
the 2000-2009 period using the fixed-effect analysis, random-effects and Hausman Chi Square estimations. 
Chechet and Olayiwola (2014) used two independent variables for the capital structure, the debt ratio and the 
equity ratio and profitability as the dependent variable. Their results showed that the debt ratio and significant 
negative associated with profitability (hipotasis I) and for the second hypothesis, debt ratio and significant 
negative associated with profitability, while equity was positively related to profitability, but not significant. 
Hypothesis 
Based on the theoretical overview, the research hypothesis is: capital structure affect the agency cost. 
Research Methods 
This study of the capital structure as measured by the ratio of debt to equity (Pratheepkanth, 2011) and agency 
cost, as measured by operating expenses to sales (Florackis and Ozkan, 2004). And as a control variable is return 
on assets (ROA), size as measured by log of sales (Li and Cui, 2003; Zhang and Li, 2008) and institutional 
ownership. Population of this research is conglomerate company listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange, 
amounting to 29 companies with years of observation as much as 174. The data used in this research is 
secondary data obtained from the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) for the period 2007 to 2012. For 
analyze the data in this study using multiple regression. 
Results and Discussion 
The results showed that, capital structure, return on assets, size and institutional ownership simultaneous and 
significant effect on agency cost, amounting to 0.233. While the rest of 0.77 (1 to 0.23) influenced by other 
factors not examined in this study such as the characteristics of the board, compensation, ownership structure 
(Florackis and and Ozkan, 2004). While the partial results of the study are: capital structure and significant 
positive effect on agency cost. Istitutional ownership a positive effect on agency cost but not significantly. Size 
positive effect on agency cost but not significantly. Return on assets and a significant negative effect on agency 
cost. The results are consistent with the results of research conducted by the Li and Cui (2003), Pratheepkanth 
(2011), Siddiqui et al (2013) and Chechet and Olayiwola (2014) which states that the capital structure has 
positive influence on agency cost, but not in line with research conducted by Jensen (1986), Agrawal and 
knoeber (1996), Florackis and Ozkan (2004), Zhang and LI (2008), Knight and Weir (2009), Xiao (2009), Gul et 
al (2012), Zheng (2013), Lakshmi (2013) and Mohammed (2013) which showed that capital structure can reduce 
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agency cost. Capital structure possible causes are positively related to agency cost is because most conglomerate 
company listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange is due to agency cost-owned by conglomerate company listed 
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange was above average (0.3988), as many as 60 %. Means that many companies 
are inefficient because 60% of companies have agency cost is above average (0.3988). And for the capital 
structure, the  conglomerate companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange had an average of 1.79 and has 
a capital structure that is below the average is as much as 77.6%. Means most conglomerate company listed on 
the Indonesian Stock Exchange are many sources of funds originating from own capital. This happens probably 
because most conglomerate company listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange has size (log sales) than average 
(14.534) is as many as 57.5% and ROA above average (5.9318), as many as 55, 4%. So most conglomerate 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange is not efficient and the funds originate from its own capital 
obtained from the ROA results of sales. 
Conclusion 
Based on the analysis of research data, it can be concluded this research is capital structure and significant 
positive effect on agency cost. This happens because most of the conglomerate companies listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange are inefficient and use their own capital as a source of funds derived from the profit 
from the sale. 
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Frequencies 
Statistics 
  
AGENCYCOST 
CAPITALSTRUS
TURE INST SIZE ROA 
N Valid 174 174 174 174 174 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean .398842 1.794253 .525603 14.534289 5.931782 
Median .268060 .900000 .580600 15.034498 5.290000 
Mode .0870 .0800 .7687a 16.9717 -11.4400a 
Std. Deviation .3719179 5.2939077 .2913240 1.8693900 10.5445693 
Variance .138 28.025 .085 3.495 111.188 
Range 2.7391 68.5900 .9547 7.9244 107.3600 
Minimum .0119 -4.1200 .0062 10.7724 -67.0100 
Maximum 2.7510 64.4700 .9609 18.6968 40.3500 
Sum 69.3985 312.2000 91.4550 2528.9663 1032.1300 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
 
 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
AGENCYCOST .398842 .3719179 174 
CAPITAL STRUSTURE 1.794253 5.2939077 174 
INST .525603 .2913240 174 
SIZE 14.534289 1.8693900 174 
ROA 5.931782 10.5445693 174 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .483a .233 .215 .3294454 1.630 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ROA, CAPITAL STRUSTURE, SIZE, INST 
b. Dependent Variable: AGENCYCOST 
 
 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.12, 2015 
 
13 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.588 4 1.397 12.871 .000a 
Residual 18.342 169 .109   
Total 23.930 173    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ROA, CAPITALSTRUSTURE, SIZE, INST 
b. Dependent Variable: AGENCYCOST 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .303 .199  1.523 .130   
CAPITALSTRUSTURE .010 .005 .148 2.176 .031 .974 1.027 
INST .071 .094 .056 .764 .446 .845 1.184 
SIZE .009 .014 .047 .669 .504 .903 1.107 
ROA -.016 .002 -.466 -6.610 .000 .912 1.097 
a. Dependent Variable: AGENCYCOST 
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